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What defines success when visions compete: lessons from
post-Katrina New Orleans
Terry van Dijk and Gerd Weitkamp
Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, AD Groningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Visions can be valuable tools for guiding and uniting land use interests in a
region with fragmented administration. What determines the strength of a
vision and how can it effectively play its role? Our study tested and
supplemented hypotheses on the success factors of visions. We chose a
city in a rebuilding process because that represents a most intensive
and pressing vision process. We interviewed local policy-makers,
designers, researchers, and journalists to find out what they would
spontaneously cite as a vision’s most crucial factors. We also reviewed
the subsequent New Orleans recovery plans and compared our findings
with hypotheses from visioning literature. The interviewees’
spontaneous answers largely confirm the key hypotheses about success
from the visioning literature. However, the most frequently mentioned
factors were not in the literature: a vision needs to be propagated by a
powerful authority, a favourable larger political climate, and the funds to
sustain the implementation process. For a vision to make a difference, it
needs to be substantively relevant and persuasive but also have a





What does a vision need to be effective? What factors enable people to devise a central idea about
future urban form that sets the agenda for future development? Ambitions are cherished, promoted,
and pursued by individuals, groups, or city councils who all hope that they are able to make a differ-
ence. Visions can coordinate the interdependent decisions that result from these ambitions. We chose
New Orleans’ post-Katrina rebuilding challenge as a specifically telling example of vision-making.
This example was used to test and supplement hypotheses about the strength of visions from litera-
ture on the success of visions. This article reports our findings on vision performance, based on inter-
views in New Orleans.
The city of New Orleans (US), lying at the mouth of the Mississippi river at the Gulf of Mexico,
was hit by a category 5 hurricane in August 2005. An estimated 80% of the city was flooded for
weeks, 180,000 homes were damaged or destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people were evac-
uated (HUD 2006). The damage was so vast that the city needed to choose in what form to rebuild.
Moreover, the disaster had exposed some of the city’s weakness. First, its location is vulnerable, part
of the protecting levees were inadequate, and thousands of homes lay deep (see Section 3) on former
marsh land that had subsided because of draining, and they flooded rapidly and deeply when the
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levees broke. Second, strong racial and class differences were exposed (Elliott and Pais 2006). The
disaster confronted the city with a necessity to decide how to rebuild and properly protect the
city against flooding.
Post-Katrina New Orleans represents a situation where a disaster damaged the city, forcing a
city that was not used to making plans to make drastic choices about how to rebuild for the
future. People asked for plans that would guide the recovery and reduce uncertainty for them as
individual actors. Just like Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Christchurch, New Zealand, and Asian coastal
zones damaged by tsunamis (Diefendorf 2009 even compares the New Orleans situation with
war-damaged German cities), New Orleans had to choose in what form it would rise from
its ashes.
In American cities in particular, this challenge is complicated by institutional fragmentation
and the racial segregation. As Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom (2004) explain (already
addressed by Blakely and Ames in 1992), the patchwork of autonomous and even financially com-
petitive municipal governments prompts exclusionary zoning and prevents metropolitan
cooperation. That is why visions are so important. However, any attempt to suggest cooperation
is likely to be interpreted in terms of racial or economic rivalry. We will discuss these effects in
Section 7.
Our study of the process of choosing how to rebuild New Orleans was conducted in order to gen-
erate generic information on what makes visions successful. Our visioning perspective distinguishes
our study from other work written about New Orleans and similar post-disaster rebuilding chal-
lenges, which typically take the perspective of recovery theory (Kates et al. 2006; Nelson, Ehren-
feucht, and Laska 2007; Olshansky 2006; Olshansky et al. 2008). Recovery theorists analyse the
total recovery process, often with an institutional focus. We emphasize the ideas carried by the recov-
ery plans on the future design of the city. We specifically wanted to learn about the catalysing power
of ideas about future urban form. Why does the content of a plan guide actions and succeed or fail in
uniting stakeholders?
It is complicated to establish a causal link between the dynamics of societal reality (i.e. urban
form, social relations, and political processes) and the mental constructs (i.e. ambitions for future
spatial situations) that partly explain them. First, it is difficult because the mental constructs address
various parts of reality; they vary in the degrees to which they are made explicit and the degree of
agreement by the wider community. But, foremost, the causal link is difficult to establish because
society and vision cannot be separated – they are one, instead of separate entities. They transform
simultaneously; it is impossible to divide them and point out a causal link with certainty. There is
too much interdependence and too much interference from other factors.
Yet, in their pretense to guide paths of development with appealing ideas, groups in society
(i.e. planners, politicians, and NGOs) do seek ways to make a difference. We use the word ‘vision’
to address the larger ideas of a city about its future development, such as strategic plans (Healey
2007). Such visions are typically in constant transformation; they are largely implicit but may be
made explicit in planning documents. And although planning documents (e.g. zoning plans)
will in practice have a more narrow scope than visions because they are partial operational
steps designed to contribute to a broader vision, they are the only documented manifestations
of visions that last. The rest of the mental images for the future have evaporated and are difficult
to reconstruct.
Our study tests and supplements the critical factors for vision performance. Section 2 reviews the
visioning literature with the purpose to extract hypotheses on success. We describe the challenge of
rebuilding New Orleans in Section 3, presenting its geographical structure and the cause and nature
of the 2005 devastation. Section 4 presents our research design, aimed at unravelling the competitive
struggle among visions and documenting which strengths and weaknesses key players in that process
now attribute to the various visions. The results are presented in Section 5. The paper concludes with
a discussion of the outcomes.
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2. Hypotheses from vision performance literature
Our New Orleans case study is meant to be instrumental to our goal to test and supplement theor-
etical assumptions about vision performance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, oppor-
tunities for the city’s future had to be explored. Given the multitude of interests, perceptions, and
opinions, this case provides a unique example of upcoming and conflicting visions.
We reviewed hypotheses about successful visions described in literature. As explained in the
introduction, we exclude post-disaster recovery literature because we chose to concentrate on the
substantive side of visions. Although, largely speaking, planning literature is extensive, literature
that specifically addresses how to devise and implement powerful city or regional visions is limited
and fragmented. This may be because it is easier to study incremental steps of improvement, such as
plans, than to study processes that address radical, innovative, large-scale, long-term transitions.
Nonetheless, several attempts have been made to analyse visioning processes.
Robert Shipley’s writing is most explicitly concerned with visioning. He concentrates on cities that
pursue radical views to guide land use, and other policies. Many cities in Europe and the US have
engaged in visioning processes with varying impacts. From Shipley, we obtained a number of
hypotheses about how to design the visioning process in such a way that the eventual performance
of the outcome is maximized.
Storytelling literature would also be applicable to implementation of a vision. Because a vision is a
compelling reflection of a possible future, the seductive force central to storytelling is of great impor-
tance in successfully using the vision to lead the way. Some books about strategic planning also hint
at the phenomenon of the vision, but without choosing clear concepts and hypotheses (for instance
Healey 2007).
2.1. Hypotheses on critical factors in visioning literature
Visioning literature presents a number of recommendations for factors that are critical to success-
fully devising visions. The factors we derived in our review of this literature are typical to collabora-
tive processes in general. This is logical, considering that visioning, like collaborative planning, refers
to ‘processes through which parties who see different aspects of the problem can constructively
explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what
is possible’ (Gray 1989, 5). This appears to imply that a powerful vision is, by definition, an
image of the future that has support from all the important actors, and that support begins when
stakeholders interact while jointly drafting the vision. A powerful vision needs broad representation
from stakeholders, active participation, and clarity about the terms of engagement; everybody has to
contribute ideas and everybody has to eventually profit from the results.
Shipley’s attempts to develop visioning theory provide a number of clues about performance vari-
ables. Foremost, a vision has to be specific and challenging (2002, 13), as ‘specific and challenging
goals lead to better performance than “do your best” goals.’ Setting high goals (H1) will result in
high performance. At the same time, the vision has to include specific goals with specific tasks
(H2) that are explicitly assigned to actors. This is important because the vision needs to overcome
the collective irresponsibility in the region that necessitated the visioning in the first place. The vision
has to assign actors to take specific actions (Shipley 2002, 15) and tasks articulate the ‘how question’
of visioning (Shipley and Michela 2006) that is both activating and relevant in helping the commu-
nity judge whether to support the vision. Support for the vision depends on the projected result but
also the way it is proposed that leads up to that result. Helling mentions the danger of devising uto-
pias instead of strategies for action, which is also the main message of Peel and Lloyd (2005). This is
in line with the specific tasks Shipley (2002) mentions, but she warns against his suggestion to set
‘challenging goals.’ Goals must not be set too high.
Furthermore, people should be asked to contribute early in the process before any solution (H3) is
proposed (Shipley 2004, 208). Preconceived solutions smother creativity but genuine participation
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allows participants to think freely and to later recognize their ideas in the result. Note the difference:
not just participation, but participation sufficiently early in the process to affect the result.
Papers presenting case studies on selected visioning processes implicitly confirm these hypotheses
to varying degrees. Helling, for instance, stresses the importance of several principles of proper col-
laborative planning and emphasizes that it is vital to produce sufficiently concrete targets to guide the
shorter term decisions (Helling 1998, 344).
Complementary to Shipley’s recommendations, Helling’s (1998) analysis of the Atlanta VISION
2020 process found the role of experts (H4) to be vital, as they can add missing information (346)
when the process is trapped in discussion about facts. Too much expert-driven process, however,
can be a pitfall when attempting to build consensus and wide support among stakeholders. Helling,
therefore, suggests that expert views have to be subservient to the people’s perceptions and preferences.
Otherwise, stakeholders may experience the process as merely symbolic, believing the experts have no
genuine interest in what the people say but only have interest in their preconceived solutions.
Helling furthermore considers it crucial for a vision to appeal to a shared sense of urgency (H5)
(Helling 1998, 345). It is dangerous to treat the collaborative process as a goal in itself, because that
will deplete energy. The goal must be to produce a compelling image of the future that effectively
guides action.
Margerum’s (2005) analysis on visioning in Denver also largely confirms the need to respect the
principles of collaborative planning in terms of actively involving population, striving for consensus
and joint learning, and managing interdependent interests. Interestingly, he believes that it would
work best on the street or neighbourhood level because regionally concerted action is too hard for
people to identify with and thus they would not support the result.
2.2. Hypotheses on critical factors in vision application
What subsequently defines the performative power of the vision in the phase after its interactive,
expert-informed drafting? Visioning literature emphasizes that a vision has to be well-rooted in
the region’s stakeholder agendas. The storytelling literature talks about how to disseminate the
results for maximum effect. Throgmorton (1996), Sandercock (2003), and Myers and Kituse
(2000) stress the rhetorical quality of the story. Is the story consistent, elegant, and clearly positioned
in time with a specified direction (H7)? Importantly, does it convey a morally compelling message?
Myers and Kituse (2000) think a story can be successful when the reader (i.e. a stakeholder you want
to persuade and activate) recognizes his position, opportunities, and responsibility. This means that
stories have to be addressed to target groups to be effective. This concurs with Shipley’s emphasis on
assigning specific tasks to actors.
However, it would be insufficient to just address stakeholders separately. Connecting multiple
interests (H8) and separate implicit visions is the power of a good vision, according to Throgmorton
(2003). A planner has to accept the stories present in the region while leaving room for newly emer-
ging micro-stories, but add to that a meta-story that connects multiple interests and, thus, joins mul-
tiple energies. This shared nature of visions is also the cornerstone of collaborative planning (also see
Peel and Lloyd 2005). That shared nature can emerge either from the vision-making process or from
very good analysis by the storyteller.
2.3. Conclusion
Critical factors for a vision to be successful are not just about content. The literature talks little about
what information a vision should contain, but more about whose agendas it must be useful to and
how, where, and when to present the message. Success for a vision is about the psychological signifi-
cance of its content. Does it spark stakeholders to act? For that, it has to connect to the stakeholders’
perceptions. As Van Dijk (2011) describes it, every new story finds itself in a context of already pre-
sent stories, leading to either rejection or adoption, but it is always transformed before being used.
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Our case study tests the validity and completeness of the literature’s success factors. The publi-
cations reviewed here explicitly label the following success factors: (1) setting high goals that are
appealing and consistent; (2) creating a roadmap with steps and assigned tasks to reach those
goals and break them down into concrete, realistic projects; (3) building on early participation;
(4) including the right amount of expert knowledge; (5) maintaining a sense of urgency; and (6) con-
necting multiple mutually benefiting interests.
3. Case description
NewOrleans is a mid-sized city in the state of Louisiana, sitting between the mouth of the Mississippi
River, where it meets the Gulf of Mexico, and Lake Ponchartrain, which forms the northern bound-
ary of the city. The city is located on the Gulf Coast, which is frequently hit by hurricanes that emerge
above the gulf and move north. They tend to reach the US mainland somewhere between Houston
and Florida, where they usually lose strength rapidly.
The Gulf Coast around New Orleans consists of extensive wetlands through which the farthest
downstream section of the Mississippi River has had multiple branches. Some branches disappeared
due to natural reroutings of the river; other branches have lost their function because of regulation of
the river that was done mostly for navigation purposes. Throughout the delta, numerous towns lie in
a complicated pattern of marshes, natural levees, and tidal canals.
The city of New Orleans was founded in 1718 on one of the natural levees formed by the river.
The levees were the sites with firmer ground, where the Mississippi had deposited coarser sand. Their
natural properties made these sites safe to live on (Campanella 2008; Ford 2010); floodwaters did not,
and still do not, reach the houses built on the natural levees. The high, old part of the city is still the
historical tourist district. From the properties at the fringe of the old town, plantations extended into
the lower and wetter areas behind the city that were harder to make habitable.
This original pattern of habitation on the natural levees, from which extended a fan of plantations
into the marshes north of town (Campanella 2008, 131), stayed in place for 200 years. Then, as Ford
(2010, 17) notes in her account of New Orleans’ development,
city leaders, however, longed to make something more of the swamps – to drain them, to recover the land and
put it to a more profitable use: sell it, collect taxes. […] In the early 1800s the city of New Orleans sponsored
construction of canals meant to drain the swamps […] using Wood’s pumps […]. […] After World War II, the
previously drained swamplands were finally – and quickly – developed all along the old drainage canals, where
man-made levees shored up resident’s confidence that the land they were living on was safe […] flooding
seemed ‘impossible’. (Ford 2010, 20)
As Campanella (2008, 158) writes: ‘progressive municipal activism and new technology radically
rewrote the “rules” that drove the geography of New Orleans’ urban growth.’
Ultimately, most of the city’s houses lay well below the level that the water in the Mississippi River
and Lake Pontchartrain reached on a regular basis (Kates et al. 2006). The houses lie protected by
floodwalls, man-made levees, and pumping stations, on soil that subsides because there is no longer
any sedimentation and the soft soils have consolidated.
Hurricane Katrina hit the city on 29 August 2005, causing major failure of the protection system
at seven or more separate locations. Dams and walls broke and vast neighbourhoods were flooded in
several hours by up to 3.5 metres of water, killing almost 2000 people. None of the pre-1900 streets
flooded; only the more recent, typically poorer, suburbs. The disaster proved the weakness of the
protection system. The apparently insufficient standards applied by the Army Corps of Engineers,
who do the civic engineering for flood protection, were criticized for causing massive failure.
After the storm, people wanted to rebuild their homes and lives. For that, they needed clarity
about the recovery process. What could they expect in the future? When would services be restored
in their streets? Would their streets be allowed to be rebuilt at all? Tens of thousands of city residents
had fled to other parts of Louisiana and other US states because their houses were uninhabitable and
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there was, temporarily, no employment for them. They needed certainty before making the leap
back. In addition, they had become aware of the dangers of the neighbourhoods they were living
in. Ideas emerged about how to rebuild in a more sustainable way.
Much research has been done into the rebuilding process, but mostly from a social geographical
point of view, describing developments in community resilience, social capital, place attachment,
psychological health, crime rates, migration, and local economy. Initially, interest in the city’s plan-
ning process was high (notably, Buby 2006; Kates et al. 2006; Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska 2007;
Olshansky et al. 2008; Olshansky and Johnson 2010), however it now seems to have faded away. Our
research extends the time span of the reconstruction of the planning process and uses the reconstruc-
tion as a case study to help develop theory about successful visions.
4. Research design
The authors visited New Orleans to collect data in early 2011. The objective was to reconstruct New
Orleans’ process of finding a vision for rebuilding the city, with the purpose to test and supplement
hypotheses from literature. Which visions can be pointed out throughout the process? How long did
they last? And, most importantly, what explains their decay or persistence? We are interested in the
visions and their performance – whether they are said to have dominated discussions on New
Orleans’ future and why.
Because visions do not have a fixed form that allows objective direct observation, our research
question is epistemologically complicated. In order to collect data on the existence of visions we
need to rely on accounts of people, accounts that are inevitably subjective and dynamic over time.
The notion of performance does not exist independently but it is a meaning attributed by people.
Answering our research question therefore implies reconstructing a set of discourses, which was
done scientifically, yet the outcomes will be a reflection of the discourses instead of an objective
truth about what actually happened.
We proceeded to make this reconstruction in the following way. We took the overview provided
by Ford (2010) as our first point of reference at the start of the field research. She gives a personal and
partial account of the New Orleans visioning process. The detailed book by Olshansky and Johnson
(2010) was used only later in order to isolate the reconstruction based on our interviews from other
reconstructions.
We then interviewed a variety of people that were involved in some or all of the post-Katrina
vision development process, and who are known to have a good overview of the total post-Katrina
planning process. We took their names from planning documents and news media that listed their
involvement in the process and, upon asking for an appointment, asked them who else we should
talk to. We did not tell the interviewees exactly beforehand what our questions would be, because
we wanted them to directly retrieve the requested information from their personal memories.
We eventually interviewed 13 people, key persons that were intensively involved in the visioning
processes, of which 11 interviews could eventually be used for our purpose of theory testing. We
chose to do in-depth interviews with these key persons, rather than a wide survey with the larger com-
munity. As a consequence, our findings, although saturated and representative for this group of key
persons, do represent only a specific part of the relevant community, implying that among other
groups other perceptions may be present. Just as is the case in quantitative research, the validity of
our reconstruction depends on the variety within the data set. After performing the steps described
above, covering the key persons, we consider our data show a sufficiently high level of saturation.
Among our interviewees were three designers directly involved drafting of one or more of the
plans; three researchers from Tulane University that have specifically published on the rebuilding
process; a high representative of a major civil engineering contractor; four journalists from local
news networks and newspapers that had reported multiple times on the search how to rebuild the
city; and two policy-makers, both employed since 2005 – one from the City of New Orleans and
one from the county. Given the weak planning culture in New Orleans (for which BGR [2006]
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proposes necessary changes), the designers, researchers, and policy-makers did what in other
countries is considered to be ‘planning.’ The information we received from the policy-makers and
the contractor was eventually not systematic enough to include in the results.
After each day of field research, the researchers from our team exchanged findings and, accord-
ingly, enhanced their foreknowledge for the next interviews. This made the team increasingly more
informed about the post-Katrina plans, allowing for better interpretation of answers by interviewees.
When interviewees gave permission, digital recordings of the interviews were used for the final ana-
lyses when our own notes were unclear.
In all interviews, we asked the interviewees: (1) to give an overview of all subsequent or parallel
post-Katrina visions; (2) to indicate in what documents these visions were articulated; (3) to approxi-
mate the time of emergence and abolition of visions; and, most importantly, and (4) to explain each
vision’s disappearance or persistence. The answers would enable a final reconstruction of the array of
visions and the reasons for their alteration. In practice, however, interviewees did not always allow
the conversation to follow the predesigned structure. We also asked the interviewees what, in general,
a vision needs in order to make a difference. We wanted to know what they spontaneously think are
the essential factors in creating effective visions.
So we did not project the theory on this case, but rather awaited the factors interviewees would
mention spontaneously and compared them to the insights that emerged from literature afterward.
This systematic and semi-quantitative way of hypothesis testing distinguishes this study from see-
mingly similar studies into New Orleans’ rebuilding efforts.
We primarily limited our discussion to the visions about the city as a whole. There have also been
several visions and plans on the level of the neighbourhood, as well as visions for the Mississippi delta
enveloping New Orleans. The repair and reinforcement of the existing structure of levees and flood-
walls around the city by the Army Corps of Engineers is, in a way, based on a vision too. Although
these levels of scale are, or at least should be, interrelated (as Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska 2007,
24, emphasize), information about such visions was not included in our study because of their differ-
ent scale in comparison to that in most of the visioning literature, and the fact that they do not touch
on improving urban form.
The remarks of the interviewees, which obviously were worded in all kinds of ways, had to be
aggregated into one-liners that represent a variety of exact statements. Because of the potentially dis-
torting effect of this aggregation, it was done as soon as possible after the actual interview by the
researchers that held the interview, possibly in interaction with the lead author.
Aside from conducting interviews, we also screened the archives of one of the city’s main news-
papers with digitally accessible archives, ‘The Louisiana Weekly.’ The Times-Picayune was not acces-
sible for us at that point. We analysed articles about visions for the recovery of New Orleans for
indications of flaws and strengths of visions. We compared these with the outcomes of the interviews
to see if additional factors were mentioned. Information from websites was treated with caution, as
their information could be coloured by agendas of the website owners. The reports of the Bureau of
Government Research for instance, (notably BGR 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010) provide analyses of
rebuilding plans, but primarily meant to comment on, and propose recommendations for, content,
process, and plan performance. We used newspaper archives and websites only for orientation but
not for primary data collection.
5. Results
Before presenting the precise data we sought to collect, some unusual features of the New Orleans
case must be explained. Every case that is selected to explore the questions we asked would be unique.
The interviewees mentioned three important aspects that make New Orleans an uncommon site for
visioning: lack of previous planning culture, displaced people ultimately not returning, and the role
of the trauma from the hurricane.
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Several interviewees indicated that New Orleans did not have an actual planning culture prior to
the Katrina disaster. City government and residents were not used to engaging in thinking about the
city’s future (also see Olshansky et al. 2008, 278; Olshansky and Johnson 2010, 236). This caused the
first plans to encounter an audience that was not used to, or even hostile to, the idea of governmental
interference in urban form. This may mean that the first plans had no real chance of succeeding.
Timing, therefore, turns out to be an important issue. Plans, in terms of content, form, and level
of ambition, are not good or bad, but rather either appropriate or not for the situation at that
point in time.
Visioning is further complicated because an estimated 125,000 people still had not returned to the
city by 2011 (Fussell, Curtis, and DeWaard 2014; Zaninetti and Colten 2012). These people fled the
city because of their damaged properties or the lack of opportunities to generate an income. It is hard
to rebuild a city when these displaced people cannot join the process; this means you have to make
decisions about properties whose owners are absent and sometimes cannot even be contacted. It also
means the city does not receive their taxes to pay for public services.
And then there is the trauma of the hurricane. The sudden massive devastation, displacement,
and the subsequent despair are likely to make people less inclined to think in terms of the bright
new futures of a better city. Even though the disaster showed the dangers of the post-Katrina
urban form, traumatized people tend to crave a return to ‘how it used to be’ (Kates et al. 2006,
14656; Olshansky and Johnson 2010, 235). Visions in that case meet a conservative attitude,
which was also said to be the New Orleans culture before Katrina. That does not necessarily
mean that no vision is accepted, but rather that visions need to make an explicit connection to
local identity and heritage in an effort to further reinforce what is cherished locally, while simul-
taneously solving important problems.
The answers given in the interviews are summarized in Table 1. The plans were the most practical
points of reference during the interviews and it was hard to make the interviewees discern between
vision (i.e. the philosophy behind choices) and plans (i.e. the operational translation of visions) that
did not necessarily coincide. That caused all interviewees to structure their account of the vision pro-
cess around the most important plans. However, we concentrated on the content of the ideas.
The table lists the plans in chronological order with the success factors the interviewees indicated.
Although, given the research questions, we did not intend to quantify our results; the table does give
numbers for how many interviewees mentioned that factor. It is an indication of the perception of
that factor’s importance. It also shows which groups of interviewees mentioned a factor and which
did not. The last column shows whether that factor is already mentioned in the literature. It is
remarkable that the interviewees did not mention issues of race and class as crucial factors for success
or failure. Some interviewees mentioned problems related to race or class without connecting it to
visioning of plans. One interviewee addressed racial and class problems related to planning, but
did not frame these problems as a crucial factor for success or failure. According this interviewee,
whether it plays a role in master planning is subject to interpretation and easily construed one
way or another.
The Bring New Orleans Back Plan (BNOB) was the first plan to be presented after the havoc
wrought by the hurricane. A commission of expert consultants installed by Mayor Ray Nagin drafted
the plan. It included ideas from a plan by the Urban Land Institute. The vision of the BNOB plan was
to make the city more compact on its higher parts and make lower parts suitable for controlled flood-
ing in case of emergencies. Shrinking the footprint of New Orleans would make the city less vulner-
able, less costly to provide services to, and more realistic given the projected population decline.
The public response to BNOB was very negative (also see Campanella 2008, 68, 344–350; Ford
2010, 30–33, 52; Olshansky and Johnson 2010, 57). Our interviewees were, however, unanimous
that the plan’s vision was not a bad one at all. And it did, at least according to the interviewees,
try to fulfil the prerequisites for collaborative planning with interactive websites, public meetings,
and a grand presentation to the public in March 2006.
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Table 1. Overview of the results.
Name of vision Presented by Timeframe
Crucial factors for success or failure
according to interviewees
Mentioned by: researchers
(out of 3) | designers (out of
3) | journalists (out of 4)
Also found in literature
(Yes/No and hypothesis
number)
BNOB (‘A Strategy for Rebuilding New
Orleans’ by the Urban Land Institute was
enveloped in this plan)
Bring New Orleans Back Commission,





. Lack of communication, public involvement 1 | 0 | 1 Y (H3)
. Flawed leadership 1 | 1 | 0 N
. People not being used to planning 0 | 0 | 2 Y (H5)
. Timing was not right; too soon to design new
futures, content did not answer people’s direct
needs
1 | 0 | 2 Y (H5)
. No phasing or practical steps for getting from
present to future
1 | 0 | 1 Y (H2)
Laissez faire strategy March 2006–
October 2006
UNOP (executed through the Blakely Plan,
named after the experts’ chairman)







. Incoherent, complicated list of projects
without much appeal
- | 1 | 0 Y (H1)
. Participation, however without creativity – | 0 | 0 Y (H3)
. Leadership – | 0 | 0 N
. Missing link to federal government – | 1 | 0 N
. Too big and expensive to be realistic – | 0 | 1 Y (H2)
Master Plan 2008-now . Timing: capitalizes on people’s awareness of
need for planning
0 | 0 | 0 Y (H5)
. Uses good ideas from former plans 1 | 2 | 0 N
. Was granted ‘the force of law’ (the eventual
actual power of that is questioned)
2 | 2 | 1 N
. Flexible 0 | 0 | 2 N
. Did not propose big changes 2 | 1 | 1 N
. Communicative, involved citizens 1 | 2 | 0 Y (H3)
In general – – . Ambitious, appealing 2 | 1 | 1 Y (H1)
o But the realistic budget makes it believable 2 | 1 | 3 N
. Genuine connection to people 2 | 3 | 2 Y (H3)
. Serves multiple interests but avoids favouring
some and damaging others
1 | 0 | 2 Y (H8)
. Right timing, using the sense of urgency and
willingness to allow change to pay for it and to
cooperate
3 | 1 | 1 Y (H5)
. Connection to government system, aligned
political will
2 | 3 | 1 N
. Leadership: clear central actor(s) with power
and potential
3 | 3 | 1 N
. Incremental steps help make planning
tangible
1 | 1 | 1 Y (H2)
o But, danger of missing the big picture 1 | 0 | 0 N
Notes: These factors were mentioned by the interviewees as vital to success. Some were linked to specific plans and some were general. Although this is not intended to be a quantitative study, we indicate in















The plan’s main flaw, as indicated by our interviewees, was the bad connection to the needs of the
city’s people at that moment. Timing was described as a very important factor here. Only six months
after the storm, the people were presented an image of a city they did not recognize, and they were
not ready to cope with the idea that some of their streets would not be rebuilt at all. The communi-
cation about the plan did not address citizens’ short-term needs, making them more insecure than
they already were. What would this vision mean for them in the short term? When and how would
they be rebuilding their lives when their original street was wiped off the map? The plan lacked a
vision for getting from the present to the projected future state. In addition to this, two interviewees
(in contrast with Ford’s [2010] much more intensive criticism) lamented the lack of leadership by the
mayor for this plan specifically. They stated that the mayor did not seem to be on top of it or even
care about people’s personal futures.
After that, according to Ford (2010, 33–36) and Campanella (2008, 353), there was a short period
where the mayor pushed a non-vision, meaning that recovery of the city would be left to market
forces. This laissez faire vision was not officially documented and most of our interviewees do not
recall this as a distinct phase in the process. It did, however, spark neighbourhood-level planning
attempts.
In late 2006, work started on the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP). It was infused by ideas from
the community-based Lambert Plans on recovering flooded areas (for 43 flooded neighbourhoods,
compiled by consultancy company Lambert Advisory during 2006) and implemented via the Blakely
Plans in 2008 (named after Ed Blakely, director of the Office of Recovery and Development Admin-
istration) – what are considered building blocks of the city-wide plans. The initial idea was to cover
the entire city and interactively develop out-of-the-box ideas with citizens, both those still living in
the city and those displaced to other cities. This, obviously, was a reaction to the BNOB’s failure. The
UNOP’s vision was not so much to create a specific new urban form but, foremost, to create a set of
pragmatic objectives that would be acceptable to citizens and that would attract recovery funds from
the federal government. It was successful in generating government funds in early 2007.
The plan evolved into a list of conservative objectives and projects centring around 17 key invest-
ment areas with a focus on acquiring funds from governments, developers, and businesses that
would be needed for neighbourhood recovery. The plan is clearly tuned to restoring the pre-Katrina
situation, using words like ‘repair,’ ‘improve,’ and ‘revise’ in relation to flood walls, infrastructure,
and housing. There are no maps and only minor hints at an adapted urban form: for instance,
‘help encourage and facilitate the redevelopment of higher elevation areas of the City that were
underutilized prior to Katrina’ (City of New Orleans 2007, 74).
The plan’s main flaw, as indicated by our interviewees, was its lack of appeal. It was called an
uninspiring list of projects that nobody could disagree on, but that did not spark enthusiasm either.
It had no story to it at all. Though the plan indicated some priorities, its massive set of goals (Appen-
dix B’s table alone covered 78 pages) may have reduced action.
The ideas for rebuilding the city culminated in the more general spatial vision in the current Mas-
ter Plan (officially titled ‘Plan for the 21st Century: New Orleans 2030’; see www.nolamasterplan.org).
It was positively assessed by all interviewees. This comprehensive plan is hundreds of pages long and
filled with numerous artistic impressions and analytical and visionary maps. It also includes exten-
sive accounts of citizen involvement and has been well received by the citizens. The plan proposes
guidelines for the future that include liveability (mainly history, green space, and health), opportu-
nity (climate for entrepreneurship), and sustainability (resilience, energy, and drinking water). Each
objective is elaborated in image, text, maps indicating impacts on urban form, and lists of rec-
ommended projects. It mainly reinforces existing qualities rather than proposing radically new
structures.
Though we perceive its substantial appeal as stemming from its elegant images of the future, the
interviewees mainly attributed its success to the force of law, its flexibility, and the moderate change
it proposes. They noted that the low level of intrusiveness would make it more acceptable to the
people and they gave it the force of law because the wards can choose to reconsider aspects of the
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plan when they have difficulties implementing them. Together with the moderate changes it pro-
poses, people tend to accept its authority because the plans accept their autonomy.
When we asked the interviewees for the most important success factors regardless of specific New
Orleans visions, several ideas were expressed, most of which were not mentioned when talking about
the plans in particular. Authority, political will, and a realistic budget scored very high. That appears
to have been a lesson for those involved in the New Orleans visioning experience.
6. Conclusions
New Orleans represents an unusual situation, whereby a city was hit by a natural disaster and forced
to make radical choices for its future urban form. Extensive flooding caused massive damage to prop-
erties but also to faith in the ability of water management technology to counter the risks of living
below sea level. It caused a flurry of planning efforts that were hard to research; we found partly con-
tradictory information on dates, objectives, and content.
We sought to supplement existing hypotheses in literature about vision performance. We inter-
viewed 11 key informants that were well informed about the process of choosing to rebuild New
Orleans and asked them: (1) to give an overview of all subsequent or parallel post-Katrina visions;
(2) to indicate in what documents these visions were articulated; (3) to approximate the time of
emergence and abolition of visions; and, most importantly; and (4) to explain each vision’s disap-
pearance or persistence. The answers enabled us to reconstruct a discourse on vision performance,
rather than reconstructing factual events. Do note, it is the discourse as formulated by the intervie-
wees who constitute a specific group that was active during the years of debate on how to rebuild
New Orleans.
Comparison of the literature with the case interviews shows that five out of six factors derived
from the visioning literature in Section 2 were actively mentioned by the interviewees. They are
once again validated. Factor 1, setting high goals that are appealing and consistent, was frequently
mentioned by all groups of interviewees as a general success factor. The need for a realistic roadmap
with steps and assigned tasks to reach those goals (Factor 2) was mentioned as one of the reasons the
BNOB plan failed, and mentioned by many interviewees as a crucial factor in general. Factor 3, build-
ing on early participation, was mentioned in relation to the BNOB and the Master Plan and was con-
sidered to be a crucial factor by almost all interviewees.
Factor 5, the sense of urgency, was mentioned as a general factor, but it also could be related to
answers about timing. Because sense of urgency is constantly changing in intensity and focus (for
instance, first to extending services to damaged neighbourhoods and later to protection against
new hurricanes), sense of urgency conflates to the frequently mentioned issue of timing. Sense of
urgency, then, is something you need to make use of by proposing the right ideas at the right
moment. Factor 8, connecting multiple mutually benefitting interests, was mentioned as a general
factor. The one factor from literature that was not heard in the answers of the interviewees was Fac-
tor 4, applying the proper amount of expert knowledge.
New factors the interviewees mentioned that we did not come across in our reviewed literature
are: (a) an actor with authority that appropriates and embodies the vision; (b) a supportive political
climate for the central idea; and (c) money to fund at least the first steps in realizing the vision. In our
New Orleans study, these factors scored very highly in terms of the number of people that mentioned
them (respectively, 7 out of 10, 6 out of 10, and 6 out of 10) – also all much higher than all the factors
found in the literature. Only the importance of genuinely connecting to people ranked equally high
(7 out of 10). This supplementary set of factors helps us to better understand the power of visioning
processes.
Shortly after Katrina, the first visions were launched under the supervision of a mayor who was
criticized for being too little involved. The appointment of Mayor Landrieu is considered to have
been a big help for effective planning and the success of the Master Plan, not least because of his
sister, a US senator. This, together with the advent of the Obama administration in Washington,
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created a very different political climate for rebuilding New Orleans. Interviewees saw this as a vital
prerequisite for vision performance. The availability of funds that make a vision viable, to an impor-
tant extent a result of authority and politics, was also considered essential for effective visioning.
Interestingly, these three interrelated factors are central in the post-disaster recovery literature
(summarized in Olshansky et al. 2008, 274) that we chose not to concentrate on because it focuses
on process and institutions. In the case of New Orleans, it is obvious that lessons about successful
visions should be informed by insights from recovery processes. But we feel that our results are rel-
evant to wider spheres than just post-disaster planning. Leadership, funds, and political climate boost
the performance of any vision. We agree with Olshansky (Olshansky et al. 2008, 279) when he says
‘post-disaster planning is just a more intense version of normal planning.’ We therefore propose to
combine the insights from these two fields of literature. Whereas recovery literature may profit from
becoming stronger on plan content, visioning literature may improve by including process more
strongly. No idea is effective without a good process, and vice versa.
Surprisingly, several factors that were indicated as crucial to plan performance were mentioned as
a negative and a positive factor at the same time. For instance, flexibility, in terms of being able to
reconsider decisions in case of future changes in insight, was mentioned as an advantage for the Mas-
ter Plan. It was also mentioned as a danger, as the plan could eventually cease to make a real differ-
ence. Integrating multiple interests in the plan was also mentioned as being both an advantage for
aligning several sources of power and a disadvantage for inadvertently excluding some groups from
benefitting. This suggests that it is not about having that factor, but about having the right amount of
that factor.
So it is partly a matter of degree: a vision needs the proper amount of many factors. And is a mat-
ter of combination: several factors are simultaneously indispensable. It is about subtle differences:
timing, influence of government, and strength of vision. A high score on one does not compensate
for a low score on another. In the case of the UNOP, all the community involvement in the world
could not make up for its lack of inspiration. It was replaced by the Master Plan, but it did succeed in
convincing authorities to extend hundreds of millions of dollars for recovery funding, illustrating a
chain reaction between subsequent plans as well.
One thing that emerges from these findings is that the less transformative a vision is, the better it
will be accepted. This was most explicitly discussed in the interviews with the designers. The first
plan for rebuilding New Orleans was very visionary with relevant ideas for how to build a more resi-
lient city. Interviewees say it lacked proper timing, but even were it presented today, we question
whether it would be accepted by the residents of New Orleans. Its vision was to make a better
city, but the people seem to want the same city. The UNOP and the Master Plan seem less visionary
and more in line with the people’s urge to turn back time. Therefore, they are accepted and con-
sidered more successful. Here, the tension between Shipley’s high goal setting and Helling’s realism
becomes evident.
7. Discussion
This paper discusses the factors that enable a vision to become the guiding idea to a place’s future for
some time. Those factors are related to the content of the vision, as well as the context a vision per-
forms in. We used post-disaster planning New Orleans as an illustrative case. We asked our inter-
viewees to explain for each of the visions of the rebuilding of New Orleans why it disappeared or
persisted. Here we reflect on the outcomes.
Intriguingly, the interviewees did not explicitly mention the issue of race. This is surprising
because in the years directly following the disaster, many scholars lamented the role of race in the
events after Katrina (Craemer 2010; Henkel, Dovidio, and Gaertner 2006; Marable and Clarke
2008). New Orleans was, and is, a divided city with stark wealth disparities between Whites and
Blacks. As a consequence, Blacks lived in the more vulnerable parts of the city, had fewer resources
to help secure their interests, and therefore suffered most from the disaster (Fussell, Sastry, and
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VanLandingham 2010). Failure to adequately respond to Katrina’s destruction has been interpreted
as an act of discrimination. Against this backdrop, a certain vision may easily have been interpreted
as an attempt to sustain these disparities and favour the interests of Whites over Black people.
Although race and class differences were and still are sensitive issues in New Orleans, no inter-
viewee indicated alleged discrimination as a factor explaining success or failure of a particular vision.
And also in the meticulous reconstruction by Olshansky and Johnson (2010), there is no explicit
mentioning of visions being criticized from a racial point of view, while in the newspapers, this
was a contested issue (e.g. in Grace 2007). The BNOB plan, for instance, promotes water storage
in lower parts of the city and higher densities in higher parts. This was obviously interpreted as
an attempt to eradicate poorer low-lying wards. Among our interviewees, three were Afro-Ameri-
cans and the other interviewees were typically progressive and engaged, and would not have been
hesitant to indicate any racial aspects of vision performance.
Racial groups are often neglected in post-disaster planning and recovery activities because they
have less political representation and economic power (Van Zandt et al. 2012). The body of literature
on race is still growing in American urban planning, often related to major urban transformation
challenges. Detroit serves in many as a landmark example reflecting the more generally encountered
spiral of balkanizing, disadvantaging, and accumulating (e.g. Sugrue 2014; Thomas 2013). Musterd
and Ostendorf (2013) as well as Marcuse and Van Kempen (2002) present evidence that this pattern
becomes more dominant outside the US as well. According to Lowe (2012, 69):
Planners ignoring this fact, believing they have little choice but to view land use decision-making primarily as a
political process – carrying out the interest of some elected officials and developers – for shaping the economic
potential of the built environment, tend to cloud and ignore the more important objectives of racial justice and
social equity.
This could explain the limited role of racial issues is our results.
Lowe (2012) appeals to planners not to ignore racial issues, but to be visionary and courageous,
and seek ways to enhance community sector efforts to create opportunities for racial justice and
social equity, which increases the likelihood for better urban planning. A strong comprehensive
plan can provide a vision for change in the community, and if equity goals are strong in the plan,
they may create an opportunity to use the recovery period to decrease inequities for socially vulner-
able populations rather than exacerbating them (Peacock et al. 2014).
In the context of this debate, the interviewees who did stress the importance of (community) par-
ticipation and political climate as factors for vision performance may have implicitly meant that race
and inequity should play a role.
The case of New Orleans’ rebuilding prompts another vital question to planning: how to define
‘success.’ A vision may be accepted, adopted, adored, generate action, and granted the force of law; a
success in short-term performance in terms of output of the democratic and formal process. Despite
that success, its content may fail to address the deeper, long-term issues that were the real cause of
the city’s problems. A vision with high performance power could be poor or average in terms of its
capacity to solve the underlying problems, or vice versa. One interviewee from the group of designers
put it this way: ‘[Many] plans stop where they should start. They were made to please everyone.’
Should plan makers listen to what individuals want today? Or should they propose what a com-
munity needs tomorrow? These are very different mind-sets. The former suits an election-driven
direct democracy, where plans are expected to reflect discourses. The latter requires a continuous
social learning process carried by experts who listen to people, and marry that to knowledge
about the place and its future to eventually set discourses. In the New Orleans case, the discourse
of more compact development on higher parts within the city, and reserving space for controlled
flooding, was not accepted, although for the experts of the BNOB crucial to make the city future
proof.
This distinction challenges the current social-constructivist and post-modernist stances taken to
planning. When we say there is no objective truth and all knowledge is no more than a construction –
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a communicative rationality always transforming into the next version of reality – we may reduce
planners to mediators without any expertise of their own. What does that mean for the mission
and ambition of planners? Alternatively, we may expect planners to try to set the discourses that
they know matter for a sustainable future.
The question of whether to serve today’s wishes of individuals versus the future needs of the com-
munity links back to Factor 5, sense of urgency. Of course, in order to make plans in the first place,
and expect any performance of them, there has to be some minimum experienced level of necessity.
The costs of drafting and implementing plans have to outweigh the benefits of the future situation
over the present one. When people feel sufficient need for change (which is typically a temporary
feeling), this sense of urgency can make a plan accepted and perfomative – in other words:
‘successful.’
Exploiting a sense of urgency and effectively setting a discourse requires trust. When there is not a
shared history of collaboration, lack of trust between groups can generate unexpected interpretations
of a vision – that the makers did not intend or anticipate – and may therefore not get accepted by
everybody (see in different context: Kotter 1995). Distrust towards authorities has been an issue in
New Orleans, which became apparent after Katrina (e.g. Cordasco et al. 2007; Eisenman et al. 2007).
Lack of communication between stakeholders in the past and racial inequalities may cause distrust
and may therefore be one of the reasons why visions form experts are not shared by the whole
community.
The urgency created by a disaster appears to be an opportunity for a vision to make a difference.
However the timing of communicating a vision is crucial here, as the results have shown. The New
Orleans case may indirectly show that racial inequalities can cause not fully exploiting the sense of
urgency to make a vision successful. While our research did not find a relationship to developing
visions, others such as Brand and Seidman stress the racially charged recovery process (2008).
Planning is caught in a dilemma between seeking to reflect the agile social-political public opinion
or promote more stable expert views on sustainable futures. Ideally, community leaders know what
kind of change a sustainable future implies, and create or exploit moments of aligning sense of
urgency whilst ignoring felt urgencies that would imply a development in a different direction.
This brings us back to the question we started out with. What factors allow can an idea to make a
difference? As it turns out, effective visionary planning is a balancing act: you have to go with the
flow, because when you try to stop it you will be ignored. But to what extent can planning bend
the trends? Our study shows that the most important factors for bending the trends are connecting
to people, authority, a supportive political climate, and sufficient financial resources. A bit of coinci-
dence is needed for all these factors to come together, but a plan that is sufficiently relevant, elegant,
and persuasive to help create a favourable environment for itself. A favourable environment will at
least partly be the merit of a persuasive vision too.
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